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1. Never Underestimate Descartes 
 
In 1637 the great philosopher, mathematician and natural scientist Rene Descartes 
published one of his most important texts, namely the Discourse on the Method of Rightly 
Conducting one’s Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences, commonly known 
simply as the Discourse (Cottingham et al. 1985a).2 This event happened over 300 years 
before Turing, Ashby, Newell, Simon and the other giants of cybernetics and early 
artificial intelligence (AI) produced their seminal work. Approximately the same time-
span separates the Discourse from the advent of the digital computer. Given these facts it 
will probably come as something of a surprise to at least some readers of this volume to 
discover that, in this text, Descartes reflects on the possibility of mechanizing mind. Not 
only that but, as I shall argue in this chapter, he elegantly identifies, and takes a far from 
anachronous or historically discredited stand on, a key question regarding the 
mechanization of mind, a question that, if we’re honest with ourselves, we still don’t 
really know how to answer. As I said, never underestimate Descartes. 
 
2. Cartesian Machines  
 
Before we turn to the key passage from the Discourse itself, we need to fill in some 
background. And to do that we need to understand what Descartes means by a ‘machine’. 
In fact, given the different ways in which Descartes writes of machines and mechanisms, 
there are three things that he might mean by that term. They are:  
 
a) a material system that unfolds purely according to the laws of blind 
physical causation;  
b) a material system that is a machine in the sense of (a), but to which in 
addition certain norms of correct and incorrect functioning apply;  
c) a material system that is a machine in the sense of (b), but which is also 
either (i) a special-purpose system or (ii) an integrated collection of 
special-purpose subsystems.3    
 
As we shall see, Descartes thinks that while there are plenty of systems in the actual 
world that meet condition (a) alone, there is nothing in the actual world that meets 
condition (b) but not condition (c). Nevertheless, he thinks it is conceivable that 
something might meet (b) but not (c), so it is important to keep these two conditions 
distinct.  
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Let’s say that conditions (a), (b) and (c) define three different types of machine: 
type-a, type-b, and type-c respectively.  So what sorts of things are there that count as 
type-a machines? Here the key observation (for our purposes) is that when it came to 
non-mental natural phenomena, Descartes was, for his time, a radical scientific 
reductionist. What made him so radical was his contention that (put crudely) biology was 
just a local branch of physics. Prior to Descartes, this was simply not a generally 
recognized option. The strategy had overwhelmingly been to account for biological 
phenomena by appealing to the presence of special vital forces, Aristotelian forms, or 
incorporeal powers of some kind. In stark contrast, Descartes argued that not only all the 
non-vital material aspects of nature, but also all the processes of organic bodily life – 
from reproduction, digestion, and growth, to what we would now identify as the 
biochemical and neurobiological processes going on in human and non-human animal 
brains – would succumb to explanations of the same fundamental character as those 
found in physics. But what was that character? According to Descartes, the distinctive 
feature of explanation in physical science was its wholly mechanistic nature. What 
matters here is not the details of one’s science of mechanics. In particular, nothing hangs 
on Descartes’ own understanding of the science of mechanics as being ultimately the 
study of nothing other than geometric changes in modes of extension.4 What matters here 
is simply a general feature of mechanistic explanation, one shared by Descartes’ science 
of mechanics and our own, namely the view that in a mechanistic process, one event 
occurs after another, in a law-like way, through the relentless operation of blind physical 
causation. What all this tells us is that, for Descartes, the entire physical universe is ‘just’ 
one giant type-a machine. And that giant type-a machine consists of lots of smaller type-a 
machines, some of which are the organic bodies of non-human animals and human 
beings. 
 
So far, so good. But when we say of a particular material system that it is a 
machine, we often mean something richer than that its behaviour can be explained by the 
fundamental laws of mechanics. We are judging additionally that certain norms of correct 
and incorrect functioning are applicable to that system. For example, a clock has the 
function of telling the time. A broken clock fails to meet that norm. Where such norms 
apply, the system in question is a type-b machine. To see how the introduction of type-b 
machines gives us explanatory leverage, we need note only that a broken type-b machine 
– a type-b machine that fails to function correctly judged against the relevant set of norms 
– continues to follow the fundamental laws of mechanics just the same as if it were 
working properly. A broken clock fails to perform its function of telling the time, but not 
by constituting an exception to the fundamental laws of mechanics. Thus we need the 
notion of a type-b machine, a machine as a norm-governed material system, to explain 
what changed about the clock, as a machine, when it stopped working. (Descartes 
himself makes these sorts of observations; see the Sixth Meditation; Cottingham et al. 
1985b.) 
 
It is a key feature of our understanding of the organic bodies of non-human animals 
and human beings – what I shall henceforth refer to as bodily machines or, to stress their 
generically shared principles of operation, as the bodily machine – that such systems 
count as machines in the richer, normatively loaded, type-b sense. This is essential to our 
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understanding of health and disease. Thus a heart that doesn’t work properly is judged to 
be failing to perform its function of pumping blood around the body. Descartes 
recognizes explicitly the normatively loaded character of the bodily machine. So where 
does he locate the source of the all-important norms of proper functioning? As Hatfield 
(1992) notes,  Descartes vacillated over this point. Sometimes he seems to argue that all 
normative talk about bodily machines is, in truth, no more than a useful fiction in the 
mind of the observer, what he calls an “extraneous label”. Thus, in the Sixth Meditation, 
he says: “When we say, then, with respect to the body suffering from dropsy, that it has a 
disordered nature because it has a dry throat but does not need a drink, the term ‘nature’ 
[the idea that the body is subject to norms of correct and incorrect functioning] is here 
used merely as an extraneous label” (Cottingham et al. 1985b, 69). At other times, 
however, an alternative wellspring of normativity presents itself. Descartes is clear that 
the bodily machine was designed by God. As he puts it in the Discourse, the body is a 
machine that was “made by the hands of God” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 139). For 
Descartes, then, organic bodies, including those of human beings and non-human 
animals, are God’s machines. Now, it seems correct to say that the functional normativity 
of a human-made machine is grounded in what the human designer of that artifact 
intended it to do. This suggests that the functional normativity of the bodily machine 
might reasonably be grounded in what its designer, namely God, intended it to do. Either 
way, the key point for our purposes is that some Cartesian machines, including all bodily 
machines, are explicable as norm-governed systems. Given the surely plausible thought 
that useful fictions can be explanatorily powerful, that would be true on either of 
Descartes’ candidate views of the source of such normativity.5   
 
Time to turn to the notion of a type-c machine – a machine as (additionally) a 
special-purpose system or as an integrated collection of special-purpose subsystems. To 
make the transition from type-b to type-c machines, we need to pay particular attention to 
the workings of the Cartesian  bodily machine. A good place to start is with Descartes’ 
account of the body’s neurophysiological mechanisms.6 According to Descartes, the 
nervous system is a network of tiny tubes along which flow the ‘animal spirits’, inner 
vapours whose origin is the heart. By acting in a way which (as Descartes himself 
explains it in the Treatise on Man) is rather like the bellows of a church-organ pushing air 
into the wind-chests, the heart and arteries push the animal spirits out through the pineal 
gland into pores located in various cavities of the brain (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 104). 
From these pores, the spirits flow down neural tubes that lead to the muscles, and thus 
inflate or contract those muscles to cause bodily movements. Of course, the animal spirits 
need to be suitably directed, so that the outcome is a bodily movement appropriate to the 
situation in which the agent finds herself. This is achieved in the following way. Thin 
nerve-fibres stretch from specific locations on the sensory periphery to specific locations 
in the brain. When sensory stimulation occurs in a particular organ, the connecting fibre 
tenses-up. This action opens a linked pore in the cavities of the brain, and thus releases a 
flow of animal spirits through a corresponding point on the pineal gland. Without further 
modification, this flow may be sufficient to cause an appropriate bodily movement. 
However, the precise pattern of the spirit-flow, and thus which behaviour actually gets 
performed, may depend also on certain guiding psychological interventions resulting 
from the effects of memory, the passions, and (crucially for what is to follow) reason.  
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The fine-grained details of Descartes’ neurophysiological theory are, of course, 
wrong. However, if we shift to a more abstract structural level of description, what 
emerges from that theory is a high-level specification for a control architecture, one that 
might be realized just as easily by a system of electrical and biochemical transmissions – 
i.e., by a system of the sort recognized by contemporary neuroscience – as it is by 
Descartes' ingenious system of hydraulics. To reveal this specification let’s assume that 
the bodily machine is left to its own devices (i.e. that it is left to function without the 
benefit of psychological interventions) and ask, ‘What might be expected of it?’. As we 
have seen, Descartes describes the presence of dedicated links between (a) specific 
peripheral sites at which the sensory stimulation occurs, and (b) specific locations in the 
brain through which particular flows of movement-producing animal spirits are released. 
This makes it tempting to think that the structural organization of the unaided (by the 
mind) bodily machine would, in effect, be that of a look-up-table, a finite table of stored 
if-this-then-do-that transitions between particular inputs and particular outputs. This 
interpretation, however, ignores an important feature of Descartes’ neurophysiological 
theory, one that we have not yet mentioned. The pattern of released spirits (and thus 
exactly which behaviour occurs) is sensitive to the physical structure of the brain. 
Crucially, as animal spirits flow through the neural tubes, they will sometimes modify the 
physical structure of the brain around those tubes, and thereby alter the precise effects of 
any future sensory stimulations. Thus Descartes clearly envisages the existence of locally 
acting bodily processes through which the unaided machine can, in principle, continually 
modify itself, so that its future responses to incoming stimuli are partially determined by 
its past interactions with its environment. The presence of such processes suggests that 
the bodily machine, on its own, is potentially capable of intra-lifetime adaptation, plus, it 
seems, certain simple forms of learning and memory. Therefore (on some occasions at 
least) the bodily machine is the home of mechanisms more complex than rigid look-up-
tables.  
 
What we need right now, then, is a high-level specification of the generic control 
architecture realized by the bodily machine, one that not only captures the intrinsic 
specificity of Descartes’ dedicated mechanisms, but that also allows those mechanisms to 
feature internal states and intrinsic dynamics that are more complex than those of, for 
example, look-up-tables.  Here is the suggestion: the bodily machine should be 
conceptualized as an integrated collection of special-purpose subsystems, where the 
qualifier ‘special-purpose’ indicates that each subsystem is capable of producing 
appropriate actions only within some restricted task-domain. Look-up-tables constitute 
limiting cases of such an architecture. More complex arrangements, involving the 
possibility of locally determined adaptive change within the task-domain, are, however, 
possible. What all this tells us is that, according to Descartes, the bodily machine is a 
type-c machine.  
 
That concludes our brief tour of the space of Cartesian machines. Now, what about 
mechanizing the mind?  
 
3. The Limits of the Machine 
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As we have seen, for Descartes, the phenomena of bodily life can be understood 
mechanistically. But did he think that the same mechanistic fate awaited the phenomena 
of mind? It might seem that the answer to this question must be a resounding ‘no’. One of 
the first things that anyone ever learns about Descartes is that he was a substance dualist. 
He conceptualized mind as a separate substance (metaphysically distinct from physical 
stuff) that causally interacts with the material world on an intermittent basis during 
perception and action. But if mind is immaterial, then (it seems) it can’t be a machine in 
any of the three ways that Descartes recognizes, since each of those makes materiality a 
necessary condition of machine-hood.  
 
Game over? Not quite. Let’s approach the issue from a different angle, by asking an 
alternative question, namely ‘What sort of capacities might the bodily machine realize?’. 
Since the bodily machine is a type-c machine, this gives us a local (organism-centred) 
answer to the question ‘What sort of capacities might a type-c machine realize?’. One 
might think that the answer to this question must be autonomic responses and simple 
reflex actions (some of which may be modified adaptively over time), but not much else. 
If this is your inclination, then an answer that Descartes himself gives in the Treatise on 
Man might include the odd surprise, since he identifies not only “the digestion of food, 
the beating of the heart and arteries, the nourishment and growth of the limbs, respiration, 
waking and sleeping [and] the reception by the external sense organs of light, sounds, 
smells, tastes, heat and other such qualities”, but also “the imprinting of the idea of these 
qualities in the organ of the ‘common’ sense and the imagination, the retention or 
stamping of these ideas in the memory, the internal movements of the appetites and 
passions, and finally the external movements of all the limbs (movements which are... 
appropriate not only to the actions of objects presented to the sense, but also to the 
passions and impressions found in memory...)” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 108). In the 
latter part of this quotation, then, Descartes takes a range of capacities that many 
theorists, even now, would be tempted to regard as psychological in character, and judges 
them to be explicable by appeal to nothing more fancy than the workings of the bodily 
machine. And here is another example of Descartes’ enormous faith in the power of 
‘mere’ organic mechanism. According to Descartes, the first stage in the phenomenon of 
hunger is excitatory activity in certain nerves in the stomach. And he claims that this 
purely physical activity is sufficient to initiate bodily movements that are appropriate to 
food-finding and eating. Thus once again we learn from Descartes that the body, unaided 
by the mind, is already capable of realizing relatively complex adaptive abilities. (This is, 
of course, not the whole story about hunger. I’ll fill in the rest later.)  
 
Should we be surprised by Descartes’ account of what the bodily machine can do? 
Not really. As we have seen, Descartes often appeals to artifacts as a way of illustrating 
the workings of the bodily machine. When he does this, he doesn’t focus on artifacts that, 
in his day, would have been thought of as dull or mundane, examples that might 
reasonably lead one to suspect that some sort of deflationary judgment on the body is in 
play. Rather, he appeals to examples that, in his day, would have been sources of popular 
awe and intellectual respect. These include clocks (rare, expensive and much admired as 
engineering achievements) and complex animal-like automata (as bought by the wealthy 
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elite of seventeenth century Europe to entertain and impress even their most sophisticated 
guests). (For more on this, see Baker and Morris 1996, 92-3.) So when Descartes 
describes the organic body as a machine, we are supposed to gasp with admiration, not 
groan with disappointment. In fact we are supposed to be doubly impressed, since 
Descartes thought that the bodily machine was designed by God, and so is “incomparably 
better ordered than any machine that can be devised by man, and contains in itself 
movements more wonderful than those in any such machine” (Discourse, Cottingham et 
al. 1985a, 139). Our bodies are God’s machines and our expectations of them should be 
calibrated accordingly.   
 
Now that we are properly tuned to Descartes’ enthusiasm for ‘mere’ mechanism, 
we can more reliably plot the limits that he placed on the bodily machine. Here, the 
standard interpretation of Descartes’ position provides an immediate answer: the bodily 
machine is incapable of conscious experience (see e.g. Williams 1990, 282-3). But is this 
really Descartes’ view?  Departing from the traditional picture, Baker and Morris (1996) 
have argued that Descartes held some aspects of consciousness to be mechanizable. This 
sounds radical, until one discovers that, according to Baker and Morris, the sense in 
which, for Descartes, certain machines were conscious is the sense in which we can use 
expressions such as ‘see’ or ‘feel pain’ to designate “(the ‘input’ half of) fine-grained 
differential responses to stimuli (from both inside and outside the ‘machine’) mediated by 
the internal structure and workings of the machine” (p.99). Those who favour the 
traditional interpretation of Descartes might retaliate – with some justification I think, 
and in spite of protests by Baker and Morris (see pp.99-100) – that Descartes would not 
have considered this sort of differential responsiveness to stimuli to be a form of 
consciousness at all, at least not in any interesting or useful sense. Indeed, if he had 
thought of things in this way he would seemingly have been committed to the claim that 
all sorts of artifacts available in his day (e.g. the aforementioned entertainment automata) 
were conscious. It is very unlikely that he would have embraced such a consequence. 
Nevertheless, in spite of such worries about the Baker and Morris line, I think that some 
doubt has been cast on the thought that consciousness provides a sufficiently sharp 
criterion for determining where, on Descartes’ view, the limits of mere mechanism lie. It 
would be nice to find something better.   
 
Time then to explore the passage from the Discourse in which Descartes explicitly 
considers the possibility of machine intelligence. Here it is:        
 
[We] can certainly conceive of a machine so constructed that it utters words, 
and even utters words which correspond to bodily actions causing a change in 
its organs (e.g., if you touch it in one spot it asks you what you want of it, if 
you touch it in another it cries out that you are hurting it, and so on). But it is 
not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements of 
words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to what is said in its 
presence, as the dullest of men can do... [And]... even though such machines 
might do some things as well as we do them, or perhaps even better, they 
would inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they were acting not 
through understanding, but only from the disposition of their organs. For 
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whereas reason is a universal instrument which can be used in all kinds of 
situations, these organs need some particular disposition for each particular 
action; hence it is for all practical purposes impossible for a machine to have 
enough different organs to make it act in all the contingencies of life in the 
way in which our reason makes us act. (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 140)  
 
Once again Descartes’ choice of language may mislead us into thinking that, on his view, 
any entity which qualifies (in the present context) as a machine must be a look-up-table. 
For example, he tells us that his imaginary robot acts “only from the disposition of [its] 
organs”, organs that “need some particular disposition for each particular action”. 
However, the way in which this robot is supposed to work is surely intended by Descartes 
to be closely analogous to the way in which the organic bodily machine is supposed to 
work. (Recall Descartes’ enthusiasm for drawing illustrative parallels between the 
artificial and the biological when describing the workings of the bodily machine.) So we 
need to guarantee that there is conceptual room for Descartes’ imaginary robot to feature 
the range of processes that, on his account, were found to be possible within the organic 
bodily machine. In other words, Descartes’ imaginary robot needs to be conceived as an 
integrated collection of special-purpose subsystems, some of which may realize certain 
simple forms of locally driven intra-lifetime adaptation, learning and memory. In short, 
Descartes’ robot is a type-c machine.  
 
With that clarification in place, we can see the target passage as first plotting the 
limits of machine intelligence, and then explaining both why these limits exist and how 
human beings go beyond them. First let’s see where the limits lie. Descartes argues that 
although a machine might be built which is (a) able to produce particular sequences of 
words as responses to specific stimuli, and (b) able to perform individual actions as well 
as, if not better than, human agents, no mere machine could either (c) continually 
generate complex linguistic responses which are flexibly sensitive to varying contexts, in 
the way that all linguistically competent human beings do, or (d) succeed in behaving 
appropriately in any context, in the way that all behaviourally normal human beings do. 
Here one might interpret Descartes as proposing two separate human phenomena – 
generative language-use and a massive degree of adaptive behavioural flexibility – both 
of which are beyond the capacities of any mere machine (for this sort of interpretation, 
see Williams 1990, 282-3). However, I think that there is another, perhaps more 
profitable way of understanding the conceptual relations in operation, according to which 
(a) and (c) ought to be construed as describing the special, linguistic instance of the 
general case described by (b) and (d). On this interpretation, although it is true that the 
human capacity for generative language-use is one way of marking the difference 
between mere machines and human beings, the point that no machine (in virtue solely of 
its own intrinsic capacities) could reproduce the generative and contextually sensitive 
linguistic capabilities displayed by human beings is actually just a restricted version of 
the point that no machine (in virtue solely of its intrinsic capacities) could reproduce the 
unrestricted range of adaptively flexible and contextually sensitive behaviour displayed 
by human beings. This alternative interpretation is plausible, I think, because when 
Descartes proceeds in the passage to explain why it is that no mere machine is capable of 
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consistently reproducing human-level behaviour, he does not mention linguistic 
behaviour at all, but concentrates instead on the non-linguistic case. 
 
To explain why the limits of machine intelligence lie where they do, Descartes 
argues as follows: Machines can act “only from the [special-purpose] disposition of their 
organs”.  Now, if we concentrate on some individual, contextually-embedded human 
behaviour, then it is possible that a machine might be built that incorporated a special-
purpose mechanism (or set of special-purpose mechanisms) which would enable the 
machine to perform that behaviour as well as, or perhaps even better than, the human 
agent. However, it would be impossible to incorporate into any one machine the vast 
number of special-purpose mechanisms that would be required for that machine to 
consistently and reliably generate appropriate behaviour in all the different situations that 
make up an ordinary human life. So how do humans do it? What machines lack, and what 
humans enjoy, is the faculty of understanding or reason, that “universal instrument which 
can be used in all kinds of situations”. In other words, the distinctive and massive 
adaptive flexibility of human behaviour is explained by the fact that humans deploy 
general-purpose reasoning processes.  
 
It is important to highlight two features of Descartes’ position here. First, 
Descartes’ global picture is one in which, in human beings, reason and mechanism 
standardly work together to produce adaptive behaviour. To see this, let’s return to the 
case of hunger introduced above.  As I explained, the first stage in the phenomenon of 
hunger (as Descartes understands it) involves excitatory mechanical activity in the 
stomach that, in a way unaided by cognitive processes, initiates bodily movements 
appropriate to food-finding and eating. However, according to Descartes, some of the 
bodily changes concerned will often lead to mechanical changes in the brain which in 
turn cause associated ideas, including the conscious sensation of hunger, to arise in the 
mind. At this point in the flow of behavioural control, such ideas may prompt a phase of 
judgement and deliberation by the faculty of reason, following which the automatic 
movements generated by the original nervous activity may be revised or inhibited. 
 
Second, the pivotal claim in Descartes’ argument is that no single machine could 
incorporate the enormous number of special-purpose mechanisms that would be required 
for it to reproduce human-like behaviour. So what is the status of this claim? Descartes 
writes (in translation) that “it is for all practical purposes impossible for a machine to 
have enough different organs to make it act in all the contingencies of life in the way in 
which our reason makes us act” (emphasis added). A lot turns on the expression ‘for all 
practical purposes’. The French phrase in Descartes’ original text is moralement 
impossible – literally ‘morally impossible’.  The idea that something which is morally 
impossible is something which is impossible for all practical purposes is defended 
explicitly by Cottingham (1992b, 249), who cites, as textual evidence, Descartes’ 
explanation of moral certainty in the Principles of Philosophy. There the notion is 
unpacked as certainty that “measures up to the certainty we have on matters relating to 
the conduct of life which we never normally doubt, though we know it is possible 
absolutely speaking that they may be false” (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 290). I am 
persuaded by Cottingham’s interpretation of the key phrase (despite the existence of 
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alternative readings; see e.g. Baker and Morris, 1992, pp.183-8, especially footnote 331 
on p.185). And I am equally persuaded by the use that Cottingham makes of that 
interpretation in his own discussion of the target passage from the Discourse (see 
Cottingham 1992b, pp.249-52). There he leans on his interpretation of moralement 
impossible to argue that Descartes’ pivotal claim does not (according to Descartes 
anyway) have the status of a necessary truth. Rather, it is a scientifically informed 
empirical bet. Descartes believes that the massive adaptive flexibility of human behaviour 
cannot be generated or explained by the purely mechanistic systems of the body, since, as 
far as he can judge, it is practically impossible to construct a machine which contains 
enough different special-purpose mechanisms. However, he is, as far as this argument is 
concerned, committed to the view that the upper limits of what a mere machine might do 
must, in the end, be determined by rigorous scientific investigation and not by 
philosophical speculation. In other words, Descartes accepts that his view is a hostage to 
ongoing developments in science. And that explains why he thinks it conceivable 
(although, on the basis of present evidence, unlikely) that something might be a type-b 
machine without being a type-c machine. 
 
4. Mechanics and Magic 
 
Say one wanted to defend the view that mind may be mechanized without exception. 
How might one respond to Descartes’ argument? Here is a potential line of argument. 
One might (a) agree that we have reason in Descartes’ (general-purpose) sense, but (b) 
hold that reason (in that sense) can in fact be mechanized, and so (c) hold that the 
machines that explain human-level intelligence (general-purpose ones) are such as to 
escape Descartes’ tripartite analysis of machine-hood. Let’s see how one might develop 
this case.  
 
Between Descartes and contemporary AI came the birth of the digital computer. 
What this did (among other things) was to effect a widespread transformation in the very 
notion of a machine. According to Descartes’ pre-computational outlook, machines 
simply were integrated collections of special-purpose mechanisms. To Descartes himself, 
then, reason, in all its (allegedly) general-purpose glory, looked staunchly resistant to 
mechanistic explanation. In the twentieth century, however, mainstream thinking in 
artificial intelligence was destined to be built (in part) on a concept that would no doubt 
have amazed and excited Descartes himself, viz the concept of a general-purpose 
reasoning machine. The introduction of mechanistic systems that realize general-purpose 
reasoning algorithms is not something that Descartes himself even considered (how could 
he have?) but (one might argue) the arrival of such systems has shown how general-
purpose reason, that absolutely core and, according to Descartes, unmechanizable aspect 
of the Cartesian mind, might conceivably be realized by a bodily machine. Let’s call such 
a machine a type-d machine. Evidence of the importance of type-d machines to AI 
abounds in the literature. It includes massively influential individual models, such as 
Newell and Simon’s General Problem Solver (Newell and Simon 1963), a program that 
used means-end reasoning to construct a plan for systematically reducing the difference 
between some goal-state (as represented in the machine) and the current state of the 
world (as represented in the machine). And it includes generic approaches to machine 
 10 
intelligence, such as mainstream connectionist theories (more on which below) that think 
of the engine room of the mind as containing just a small number of general-purpose 
learning algorithms, such as Hebbian learning and back-propagation.7  
 
So is this a good response to Descartes’ argument? I don’t think so. Why? Because 
it runs headlong into a long-standing enemy of AI known as the frame problem. In its 
original form, the frame problem is the problem of characterizing, using formal logic, 
those aspects of a state that are not changed by an action (see e.g. Shanahan 1997). 
However, the term has come to be used in a less narrow way, to name a multi-layered 
family of interconnected worries to do with the updating of epistemic states in relevance-
sensitive ways (see e.g. the range of discussions in Pylyshyn 1987). A suitably broad 
definition is proposed by Fodor, who describes the frame problem as “the problem of 
putting a “frame” around the set of beliefs that may need to be revised in the light of 
specified newly available information” (Fodor 1983, 112-13). Here I shall be concerned 
with the frame problem in its more general form.        
 
To see why the framing requirement described by Fodor constitutes a bona fide 
problem, as opposed to merely a description of what needs doing, consider the following 
example due to Dennett (1984).  Imagine a mobile robot that has the capacity to reason 
about its world by proving theorems on the basis of internally stored, logic-based 
representations. (This architecture is just one possibility. Nothing about the general frame 
problem means that it is restricted to control systems whose representational states and 
reasoning algorithms are logical in character.) This robot needs power to survive.  When 
it is time to find a power-source, the robot proves a theorem such as PLUG-INTO(Plug, 
Power-source). The intermediate steps in the proof represent sub-goals which the robot 
needs to achieve, in order to succeed at its main goal of retrieving a power-source (cf. the 
means-end reasoning algorithm deployed by GPS, as mentioned above).  
 
Now, consider what might happen when our hypothetical robot is given the task of 
collecting its power-source from a room which also contains a bomb. The robot knows 
that the power-source is resting on a wagon, so it decides (quite reasonably, it seems) to 
drag that wagon out of the room. Unfortunately the bomb is on the wagon too. The result 
is a carnage of nuts, bolts, wires, and circuit boards.  It is easy to see that the robot was 
unsuccessful here because it failed to take account of one crucial side-effect of its action, 
viz the movement of the bomb. So, enter a new improved robot. This one operates by 
checking for every side-effect of every plan that it constructs. This robot is unsuccessful 
too, simply because it never gets to perform an action. It just sits there and ruminates. 
What this shows is that it is no good checking for every side-effect of every possible 
action before taking the plunge and doing something. There are just too many side-effects 
to consider, and most of them will be entirely irrelevant to the context of action. For 
example, taking the power-source out of the room changes the number of objects in the 
room, but, in this context, who cares? And notice that the robot needs to consider not 
only things about its environment which have changed, but also things which have not. 
Some of these will be important some of the time, given a particular context. So the robot 
needs to know which side-effects of its actions and which unchanged facts about its 
world are relevant, and which are not. Then it can just ignore all the irrelevant facts. Of 
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course, if the context of action changes, then what counts as relevant may change. For 
instance, in a different context, it may be absolutely crucial that the robot takes account 
of the fact that, as a result of its own actions, the number of objects in the room has 
changed. 
 
We have just arrived at the epicentre of the frame problem, and it’s a place where 
the idea of mind as machine confronts a number of difficult questions. For example, 
given a dynamically changing world, how is a purely mechanistic system to take account 
of those state-changes in that world (self-induced or otherwise) which matter, and those 
unchanged states in that world which matter, whilst ignoring those which do not? And 
how is that system to retrieve and (if necessary) to revise, out of all the beliefs that it 
possesses, just those beliefs that are relevant in some particular context of action? In 
short, how might a ‘mere’ machine behave in ways that are sensitive to context-
dependent relevance?  
 
One first-pass response to these sorts of questions will be to claim that the machine 
should deploy stored heuristics (rules of thumb) that determine which of its rules and 
representations are relevant in the present situation. But are relevancy heuristics really a 
cure for the frame problem?  It seems not. The processing mechanisms concerned would 
still face the problem of accessing just those relevancy heuristics that are relevant in the 
current context. So how does the system decide which of its stored heuristics are 
relevant? Another, higher-order set of heuristics would seem to be required. But then 
exactly the same problem seems to re-emerge at that processing level, demanding further 
heuristics, and so on. It is not merely that some sort of combinatorial explosion or infinite 
regress beckons here (which it does). A further concern, in the judgment of some notable 
authorities, is that we seem to have no good idea of how a computational process of 
relevance-based update might work. As Horgan and Tienson (1994) point out, the 
situation cannot be that the system first retrieves an inner structure (an item of 
information or a heuristic), and then decides whether or not it is relevant, as that would 
take us back to square one. But then how can the system assign relevance until the 
structure has been retrieved?  
 
But if the frame problem is such a nightmare, how come AI hasn’t simply ground 
to a halt? According to many front-line critics of the field (including Dreyfus, this 
volume), most AI researchers (classical and connectionist) have managed to side-step the 
frame problem precisely because they have tended to assume that real-world cognitive 
problem-solving can be treated as a kind of messy and complicated approximation to 
reasoning (or learning) in artificially restricted worlds that are relatively static, essentially 
closed, and feature some small number of contexts of action. In such worlds, all the 
contexts that could possibly arise may be identified and defined, alongside all the factors 
that could possibly count as relevant within each of them. So the programmer can either 
take comprehensive and explicit account of the effects of every action or change, or work 
on the assumption that nothing changes in a scenario unless it is explicitly said to change 
by some rule. And if those strategies carried too high an adaptive cost in terms of 
processing resources, well-targeted relevancy heuristics would appear to have a good 
chance of heading off the combinatorial explosions and search difficulties that threaten. 
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One might think, however, that the actual world often consists of an indeterminate 
number of dynamic, open-ended, complex scenarios in which context-driven and context-
determining change is common and ongoing, and in which vast ranges of cognitive space 
might, at any time, contain the relevant psychological elements. It is in this world that the 
frame problem really bites, and in which (it seems) the aforementioned strategies must 
soon run out of steam.  
 
From what we have seen so far, the frame problem looks to be a serious barrier to 
the mechanization of mind. Indeed, one possible conclusion that one might draw from the 
existence and nature of the frame problem is that human intelligence is a matter of magic 
not mechanics. However, it is at least arguable that the frame problem is in fact a by-
product of mind conceived as a general-purpose (type-d) machine, rather than of mind 
conceived as machine simpliciter. What mandates this less extreme conclusion? It’s the 
following line of thought. On the present proposal, what guarantees that “[mechanical] 
reason is [in principle] a universal instrument which can be used in all kinds of 
situations” is, at root, that the reasoning mechanism concerned has free and total access to 
a gigantic body of rules and information. Somewhere in that vast sea of structures lie the 
cognitive elements that are relevant to the present context. The perhaps insurmountable 
problem is how to find them in a timely fashion using a process of purely mechanical 
search. What this suggests is that we might do well to reject the very idea of the bodily 
machine as a general-purpose reasoning machine, and to investigate what happens to the 
frame problem if we refuse to accept Descartes’ invitation to go beyond special-purpose 
mechanisms in our understanding of intelligence. 
 
Here is the view from the armchair: a system constructed from a large number of 
special-purpose mechanisms will simply take the frame problem in its stride. This is 
because, in any context of action, the special-purpose mechanism that is appropriately 
activated will, as a direct consequence of its design, have access to no more than a highly 
restricted subset of the system’s stock of rules and representations. Moreover, that subset 
will include just those rules and representations that are relevant to the adaptive scenario 
in which the system finds itself. Therefore the kind of unmanageable search space that the 
frame problem places in the path of a general-purpose mechanism is simply never 
established. So those are the armchair intuitions. But is there any evidence to back them 
up? Here is a much-discussed model from the discipline of biorobotics.   
 
Consider the ability of the female cricket to find a mate by tracking a species-
specific auditory advertisement produced by the male. According to Barbara Webb’s 
robotic model of the female cricket’s behaviour, here, roughly, is how the phonotaxis 
system works (for more details, see Webb 1993, 1994, or the discussion in Wheeler 
2005). The basic anatomical structure of the female cricket’s peripheral auditory system 
is such that the amplitude of her ear-drum vibration will be higher on the side closer to a 
sound-source. Thus, if some received auditory signal is indeed from a conspecific male, 
all the female needs to do to reach him (all things being equal) is to continue to move in 
the direction indicated by the ear-drum with the higher amplitude response. So how is 
that the female tracks only the correct stimulus? The answer lies in the activation profiles 
of two interneurons (one connected to each of the female cricket’s ears) that mediate 
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between ear-drum response and motor behaviour. The decay rates of these interneurons 
are tightly coupled with the specific temporal pattern of the male’s song, such that signals 
with the wrong temporal pattern will simply fail to produce the right motor-effects.  
 
Why is this robotic cricket relevant to the frame problem? The key idea is 
suggested by Webb’s own explanation of why the proposed mechanism is adaptively 
powerful: “Like many other insects, the cricket has a simple and distinctive cue to find a 
mate, and consequently can have a sensory-motor mechanism that works for this cue and 
nothing else: there is no need to process sounds in general, provided this specific sound 
has the right motor effects. Indeed, it may be advantageous to have such specificity built 
in, because it implicitly provides ‘recognition’ of the correct signal through the failure of 
the system with any other signal” (Webb 1993, 1092). A reasonable gloss on this picture 
would be that, rather than starting outside of context and having to find its way in using 
relevancy heuristics and so on, the cricket’s special purpose mechanism, in the very 
process of being activated by a specific environmental trigger, brings a context of activity 
along with it, implicitly realized in the very operating principles which define that 
mechanism’s successful functioning. Thus, to repeat the armchair intuition, there is no 
frame problem here because the kind of unmanageable search space that the frame 
problem places in the path of a general-purpose mechanism is simply never established. 
 
If one takes the sort of mechanism described by Webb, generalizes the picture so 
that one has an integrated architecture of such mechanisms, and then looks at the result 
through historically tinted glasses, then it seems to reflect two of Descartes’ key thoughts: 
(a) that organic bodies are collections of special-purpose subsystems (type-c machines), 
and (b) that such subsystems (individually and in combination) are capable of some 
pretty fancy adaptive stuff. Moreover, this would seem to be a machine that solves the 
frame problem (in effect, by not letting it arise). This looks to be a step forward – and it 
is. Unfortunately, however, it falls short of what we need. It falls short because while it 
solves the frame problem, it doesn’t solve Descartes’ problem. As we know, Descartes 
himself argued that there was a limit to what any collection of special-purpose 
mechanisms could do: no single machine, he thought, could incorporate the enormous 
number of special-purpose mechanisms that would be required for it to reproduce the 
massive adaptive flexibility of human behaviour. That’s why, in the end, Descartes 
concludes that intelligent human behaviour is typically the product of general-purpose 
reason. Nothing we have discovered so far suggests that Descartes was wrong about that. 
Here’s the dilemma, in a nutshell: If we mechanize general-purpose reason, we get the 
frame problem; so that’s no good. But if we don’t mechanize general-purpose reason, we 
have no candidate mechanistic explanation for the massive adaptive flexibility of human 
behaviour; so that’s no good either. The upshot is that if we are to resist Descartes’ anti-
mechanistic conclusion, something has to give.  
 
At this juncture let’s return to the target passage from the Discourse. There is, I 
think, a tension hidden away in Descartes’ claim that (as it appears in the standard 
English translation) “reason is a universal instrument which can be used in all kinds of 
situations”. Strictly speaking, if reason is a universal instrument then, at least potentially, 
it ought to be possible for it to be applied unrest
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this is right then ‘all kinds of situations’ needs to be read as ‘any kind of situation’. 
However, I don’t think we ordinarily use the phrase ‘all kinds of’ in that way. When we 
say, for example, that the English cricket team, repeatedly slaughtered by Australia 
during the 2006-7 Ashes tour, are currently in ‘all kinds of problems’, we mean not that 
the team faces all the problems there are in the world, but rather that they face a wide 
range of different problems. But now if this piece of ordinary language philosophy is a 
reliable guide for how we are meant to read Descartes’ claim about reason, then that 
claim is weakened significantly. The suggestion now is only that reason is an instrument 
that can be used in a wide range of different situations.  
 
With this alternative interpretation on the table, one might think that the prospects 
for an explanation of human reason in terms of the whirrings of a type-c machine are 
improved significantly. The argument would go like this:  
 
Human reason is, in truth, a suite of specialized psychological skills and 
tricks with domain-specific gaps and shortcomings. That would still be an 
instrument that can be used in a wide range of different situations. And by 
Descartes’ own lights, a material system of integrated special-purpose 
mechanisms (a type-c Cartesian machine) ought to be capable of this sort of 
cognitive profile.  
 
But this is to move too quickly. For even if the claim that reason is a “universal 
instrument” over-states just how massively flexible human behaviour really is, it’s 
undeniably true that human beings are impressively flexible. Indeed, the provisional 
argument just aired fails to be sufficiently sensitive to the thought that an instrument that 
really can be used successfully across a wide range of different situations is an instrument 
that must be capable of fast, fluid and flexible context-switching. Crucially, this sort of 
capacity for real-time adaptation to new contexts appears to remain staunchly resistant to 
exhaustive explanation in terms of any collection of purely special-purpose mechanisms. 
The worry is this: so far, we have no account of the mechanistic principles by which a 
particular special-purpose mechanism is selected from the vast range of such mechanisms 
available to the agent and then placed in control of the agent’s behaviour at a specific 
time. One can almost hear Descartes’ ghost as he claims that we will ultimately need to 
posit a general-purpose reasoning system whose job it is to survey the options and make 
the choice. But if that’s the ‘solution’, then the door to the frame problem would be re-
opened, and we would be back to square one (or thereabouts).  
 
5. Plastic Machines 
 
Our task, then, is to secure adaptive flexibility on a scale sufficient to explain open-ended 
adaptation to new contexts, without going beyond mere mechanism and without a return 
to Cartesian general purpose reason. Here is a suggestion (an incomplete one, I freely 
admit) for how this might be achieved.  
 
Roughly speaking, the term ‘connectionism’ picks out research on a class of 
intelligent machines in which a (typically) large number of interconnected units process 
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information in parallel. In as much as the brain too is made up of a large number of 
interconnected units (neurons) that process information in parallel, connectionist 
networks are ‘neurally inspired’, although usually at a massive level of abstraction. Each 
unit in a connectionist network has an activation level regulated by the activation levels 
of the other units to which it is connected, and, standardly, the effect of one unit on 
another is either positive (if the connection is excitatory) or negative (if the connection is 
inhibitory). The strengths of these connections are known as the network’s weights, and it 
is common to think of the network’s ‘knowledge’ as being stored in its set of weights. 
The values of these weights are (in most networks) modifiable, so, given some initial 
configuration, changes to the weights can be made which improve the performance of the 
network over time. In other words, within all sorts of limits imposed by the way the input 
is encoded, the specific structure of the network, and the weight-adjustment algorithm, 
the network may learn to carry out some desired input-output mapping.  
 
Most work on connectionist networks has tended to concentrate on architectures 
that, in effect, limit the range and complexity of possible network dynamics. These 
features include (a) neat symmetrical connectivity, (b) noise-free processing, (c) update 
properties which are based either on a global, digital pseudo-clock or on methods of 
stochastic change, (d) units which are uniform in structure and function, (e) activation 
passes that proceed in an orderly feed-forward fashion, and (f) a model of 
neurotransmission in which the effect of one neuron’s activity on that of a connected 
neuron will simply be either excitatory or inhibitory, and will be mediated by a simple 
point-to-point signalling process. Quite recently, however, some researchers have come 
to favour a class of connectionist machines with richer system dynamics, so-called 
dynamical neural networks (henceforth DNNs).  
 
What we might, for convenience, call mark-one DNNs feature the following sorts 
of properties (although not every bona fide example of a mark-one DNN exhibits all the 
properties listed): asynchronous continuous-time processing, real-valued time delays on 
connections, non-uniform activation functions, deliberately introduced noise, and 
connectivity which is not only both directionally unrestricted and highly recurrent, but 
also not subject to symmetry constraints (see e.g. Beer and Gallagher 1992, Husbands et 
al. 1995). Mark-two DNNs add two further twists to the architectural story. In these 
networks, christened GasNets (Husbands et al. 1998), the standard DNN model is 
augmented with (i) modulatory neurotransmission (according to which fundamental 
properties of neurons, such as their activation profiles, are transformed by arriving 
neurotransmitters), and (ii) models of neurotransmitters that diffuse virtually from their 
source in a cloud-like, rather than a point-to-point, manner, and thus affect entire volumes 
of processing structures. GasNets thus provide a platform for potentially rich interactions 
between two interacting and intertwined dynamical mechanisms – virtual cousins of the 
electrical and chemical processes in real nervous systems. Diffusing ‘clouds of 
chemicals’ may change the intrinsic properties of the artificial neurons, thereby changing 
the patterns of ‘electrical’ activity, whilst ‘electrical’ activity may itself trigger ‘chemical’ 
activity. So, dropping the scare quotes, these biologically inspired machines feature 
neurotransmitters that may not only transform the transfer functions of the neurons on 
which they act, but which may do so on a grand scale, as a result of the fact that they act 
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by gaseous diffusion through volumes of brain-space, rather than by electrical 
transmission along connecting neural wires.  
 
Systems of this kind have been artificially evolved8 to control mobile robots for 
simple homing and discrimination tasks. So what does the analysis of such machines tell 
us? Viewed as static wiring diagrams, many of the successful GasNet controllers appear 
to be rather simple structures. Typical networks feature a very small number of primitive 
visual receptors, connected to a tiny number of inner and motor neurons by just a few 
synaptic links. However, this apparent structural simplicity hides the fact that the 
dynamics of the networks are often highly complex, involving, as predicted, subtle 
couplings between chemical and electrical processes. For example, it is common to find 
adaptive use being made of oscillatory dynamical sub-networks, some of whose 
properties (e.g., their periods) depend on spatial features of the modulation and diffusion 
processes, processes which are themselves determined by the changing levels of  
electrical activity in the neurons within the network (for more details, see Husbands et al. 
1998). Preliminary analysis suggests that these complex interwoven dynamics will 
sometimes produce solutions which are resistant to any modular decomposition. 
However, there is also evidence of a kind of transient modularity in which, over time, the 
effects of the gaseous diffusible modulators drive the network through different phases of 
modular and non-modular organization (Husbands, personal communication).  
 
What seems clear, then, is that the sorts of machines just described realize a 
potentially powerful kind of ongoing fluidity, one that involves the functional and even 
the structural reconfiguration of large networks of components. This is achieved on the 
basis of bottom-up systemic causation that involves multiple simultaneous interactions 
and complex dynamic feedback loops, such that (a) the causal contribution of each 
systemic component partially determines, and is partially determined by, the causal 
contributions of large numbers of other systemic components, and, moreover, (b) those 
contributions may change radically over time. (This is what Clark (1997) dubs 
continuous reciprocal causation.) At root, GasNets are mechanisms of significant 
adaptive plasticity, and it seems plausible that it is precisely this sort of plasticity that, 
when harnessed and tuned appropriately by selection or learning to operate over different 
time-scales, may be the mechanistic basis of open-ended adaptation to new contexts. It is 
a moot point whether or not this plasticity moves us entirely beyond the category of type-
c machines. To the extent that one concentrates on the way in which GasNets may shift 
from one kind of modular organization to another (in realizing the kind of transient 
modularity mentioned above), the view is compatible with a story in which context 
switching involves a transition from one arrangement of special-purpose systems to 
another. Under these circumstances, perhaps it would be appropriate to think of GasNets 
as type-c.5 machines.   
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
 
In the Discourse, Descartes lays down a challenge to the advocate of the mechanization 
of mind. How can the massive adaptive flexibility of human-level intelligence be 
explained without an appeal to a non-mechanistic faculty of general-purpose reason? 
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Descartes’ scientifically informed empirical bet is that it cannot. Of course, his 
conclusion is based on an understanding of machine-hood that is linked conceptually to 
the notion of special-purpose mechanisms. This understanding, and thus his conclusion, 
has been disputed by the subsequent attempt in AI to mechanize general-purpose reason. 
However, since this ongoing attempt is ravaged by the frame problem, it does not 
constitute a satisfactory response to Descartes’ challenge. Are plastic machines, as 
exemplified by GasNets, the answer? As I write, I know of no empirical work which 
demonstrates conclusively that the modulatory processes instantiated in GasNets can 
perform the crucial context-switching function that I have attributed to them. For while 
there is abundant evidence that such processes can mediate the transition between 
different phases of behaviour within the same task (Smith et al. 2001), that is not the 
same thing as switching between contexts, which typically involves a re-evaluation of 
what the current task might be. Nevertheless, it is surely a thought worth pursuing that 
fluid functional and structural reconfiguration, driven in a bottom-up way by low-level 
neuro-chemical mechanisms, may be at the heart of the more complex capacity. But that 
is my scientifically informed empirical bet, and it is one that needs to be balanced against 
Descartes’ own. At present Descartes’ challenge remains essentially unanswered. Never 
underestimate Descartes. (Have I said that?)  
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1 This chapter draws extensively on material from my book Reconstructing the Cognitive 
World: the Next Step (Wheeler 2005), especially chapters 2, 7 and 10. Sometimes text is 
incorporated directly. Having said that, my re-use of that material here is not simply a re-
hash of it. The present treatment has some new things to say about Descartes’ enduring 
legacy in the science of mind. 
    
2 All quotations from, and page numbers for, Descartes’ own writings are taken from the 
now-standard English editions of the texts in question. For the texts referred to here, this 
means the translations contained in (Cottingham et al. 1985a, 1985b).  
 
3 The first two of these notions are identified in Descartes’ work by Hatfield (1992, 360-
2). The third is not.  
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4 For Descartes, the essential property of matter is that it takes up space, i.e., that it has 
extension. In effect, mechanics studies changes in manifestations of that property. 
 
5 For the view that useful fictions can be explanatorily powerful, see (one common way 
of understanding) Dennett’s position on psychological states such as beliefs and desires  
(Dennett, 1987). Post-Darwin, the overwhelming temptation will be to see natural 
selection as the source of functional normativity in the case of the bodily machine. On 
this view, the function of some bodily element will be the contribution that that element 
has made to survival and reproduction in ancestral populations. Descartes, writing two 
hundred years before Darwin, didn’t have this option in his conceptual tool-kit.  
 
6 For a more detailed description of these mechanisms, see (Hatfield 1992, 346). 
 
7  In the present context, the fact that AI came to mechanize general-purpose reason is 
plausibly interpreted as a move against Descartes. However, this is not the only way of 
looking at things. Aside from its mechanization, nothing about the nature and 
contribution of reason as a psychological capacity underwent significant transformation 
in the process of appropriation by AI. Thus, viewed from a broader perspective, one 
might argue that, by mechanizing general-purpose reason in the way that it did, AI 
remained within a generically Cartesian framework. For much more on this, see (Wheeler 
2005, especially chapters 2 and 3).     
 
8 Roughly speaking, design by artificial evolution works as follows: First one sets up a 
way of encoding potential solutions to some problem as genotypes. Then, starting with a 
randomly generated population of potential solutions, and some evaluation task, one 
implements a selection cycle such that more successful solutions have a proportionally 
higher opportunity to contribute genetic material to subsequent generations, i.e., to be 
‘parents.’ Genetic operators analogous to recombination and mutation in natural 
reproduction are applied to the parental genotypes to produce ‘children,’ and (typically) a 
number of existing members of the population are discarded so that the population size 
remains constant. Each solution in the resulting new population is then evaluated, and the 
process starts all over again. Over successive generations, better solutions are discovered. 
In GasNet research, the goal is to design a network capable of achieving some task, and 
artificial evolution is typically allowed to decide fundamental architectural features of 
that network, such as the number, directionality, and recurrency of the connections, the 
number of internal units, and the parameters controlling modulation and virtual gas 
diffusion.  
 
